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Abstract
Between 1941 and 1944, the Spanish Division of Volunteers took part in the Russian campaign as 
a unit integrated in the German Wehrmacht. Post-1945 war memoirs and even some historians 
have suggested that the ‘Blue’ Division was exceptional for their benign treatment of civilians and 
prisoners, distanced from the German War of Extermination. This image has not been subjected 
to critical enquiry. To what degree were the Spanish troops different from other Wehrmacht 
troops? Was the collective behaviour of the Spanish soldiers determined by the circumstances 
they encountered at the front, or was it related to their prior political socialization?
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The Spanish Division of Volunteers (División Española de Voluntarios) was set up by the 
Franco Regime in early summer, 1941, to take part in the Russian campaign as a unit – 
the 250th Spanish Volunteers Division – integrated within the German Wehrmacht. From 
24 June through to the first week of July 1941, hundreds of volunteers joined what would 
become known as the División Azul, the ‘Blue Division’ (BD), which was initially com-
posed of around 17,000 combatants. They were recruited by both the Spanish Fascist 
Party, the Falange, which provided most of the rank-and-file soldiers, and the Spanish 
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Novgorod, 2014), and Aleksei V. Elpatevskij, Golubaja divizija: voennoplennye i interniro-
vannye ispancy v SSSR (Saint Petersburg, 2015).
  2 For more details, see Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, ‘“Russland war nicht schuldig”. Die 
Ostfronterfahrung der spanischen Blauen Division in Selbstzeugnissen und Autobiographien, 
1943–2004’, in Stig Förster, Karen Hagemann, and Michael Epkenhans (eds), Soldat und 
Gesellschaft. Biographien und Selbstzeugnisse in der Militärgeschichte (Paderborn, 2006), 
pp. 236–67.
  3 For the ‘situationist’ argument, which stresses the effects of the combat environment on the 
brutalization of German soldiers’ conduct, see Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, Soldaten. 
Protokolle von Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben (Frankfurt a.M., 2011). For the argument con-
cerning Nazi indoctrination of German soldiers and officers as a necessary prerequisite for 
their brutalization, see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941–45, German Troops and the 
Barbarisation of Warfare (Houndmills/New York, 2001 [1985]). A recent reappraisal of this 
thesis is in Felix Römer, Kameraden. Die Wehrmacht von innen (Munich/Zürich, 2012).
Army, which supplied the officer and non-commissioned officer corps. The majority of 
the volunteers recruited in the summer of 1941 and throughout 1942 were strongly moti-
vated by anti-communism; and up to 20–25 per cent of them also shared Fascist tenets. 
High casualties on the harsh Eastern Front created the need for replacements and nearly 
30,000 more volunteers were sent from Spain to Russia throughout late autumn of 1943. 
Almost 5,000 soldiers died. The Spaniards were deployed in the northern area of the 
Eastern Front, under the command of the Army Group North, first on the Volkhov Front 
(October 1941–August 1942), and later at the southern corner of the siege of Leningrad 
(until March 1944).1
Post-1945 memoirs of war veterans and even some professional historiography sug-
gest that the Blue Division was exceptional among the forces occupying the Eastern 
Front for their extraordinarily benign treatment of the Russian civilian population, Jews, 
and Red Army prisoners. The presence of the Spanish volunteers in Russia was presented 
as an anti-communist venture, devoid of national-socialist sympathies and distanced 
from the Third Reich’s War of Extermination.2 However, this image of the Iberians as 
‘good invaders’ has rarely been subjected to critical enquiry or historical questions simi-
lar to those addressed in the vast historiography concerning the conduct of German 
troops and their allies on the Eastern Front. To what degree were the Spanish troops dif-
ferent from other Wehrmacht troops? Was the Blue Division truly the peaceful oasis it 
was made out to be within the Ostheer, with respect to their treatment of the civilian 
population and prisoners of war? In the war of extermination were the Spaniards an 
exception or just a variation? Was the collective behaviour of the Spanish soldiers deter-
mined by the brutalizing circumstances they encountered at the front, or was it related 
more to prior political socialization and ideological indoctrination of the volunteers, 
which conditioned their attitudes towards the act of killing?3 The answers will come 
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y Política 26 (2011), pp. 259–90.
  5 The literature on the German–Soviet war is vast. Some recent attempts at synthesis can be 
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(Lexington, 2011); Christoph Hartmann et al., Der deutsche Krieg im Osten 1941–1944. 
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  6 Directivas para la conducta de la tropa en Rusia, G.S. 2nd section, n.d., Archivo General 
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  7 Spanish Volunteers Division (DEV) General Staff, Amplación de Normas Jurídicas internas 
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through a sociocultural focus on the experiences of the Iberian volunteers, that explores 
their perception of the enemy, of Russia, and of the Jews while also empirically analys-
ing their behaviour towards civilians, prisoners, and Jews.4 This approach looks at the 
context in which they acted, through a combined and selective use of different sources.
Nazi Germany embarked on a War of Extermination aimed at many segments of the 
Soviet population. Key practices involved denying Soviet soldiers civilized treatment, 
eliminating political commissars, working to annihilate the Jewish population, widening 
the margins for applying military justice to the civilian population, and ignoring their 
need for provisions. Many of these premises were outlined in the Directives for Troop 
Conduct in Russia (19 May 1941), the ‘Commissar Order’ (6 June 1941), the ‘Decree 
regarding the exercise of war jurisdiction’ (13 May 1941), and instructions regarding the 
treatment of prisoners of war (16 June 1941).5 Some of these guidelines were soon 
adapted to the Spanish troops as Directivas para la conducta de la tropa en Rusia, which 
identified Bolshevism as ‘the moral enemy of the new Europe’. The battle was aimed 
against their ‘corrosive ideas and representatives’, for which ‘the fight requires robust, 
impartial action against all Bolshevik elements, such as agitators, snipers, saboteurs or 
Jews; and complete elimination of all resistance, whether active or passive’. In the same 
vein, towards ‘all members of the Red Army, including the prisoners’ a ‘most severe 
attitude and utmost care should be observed, as they will most likely employ treacherous 
methods in combat’. They branded the ‘Asian soldiers of the Red Army’, who were 
‘impervious, inscrutable, insidious and insensitive’, as particularly dangerous. When 
entire units were captured, ‘the commanders should be immediately separated from the 
rest of the troops’. A significant portion of the civilian population was reportedly anti-
communist, but ‘the utmost caution should be employed when speaking to the population 
and when addressing women’. Looting was forbidden, but ‘merchandise of all types … 
especially victuals and fodder, fuel and clothing, should be preserved and impounded’.6 
These orders were somewhat softened by the Instrucción General 3.005 issued by the 
Blue Division General Staff in August 1941, which stipulated that the inhabitants of 
occupied territories and their possessions were to be respected, requisitions were only to 
be carried out as compensation, prisoners were to be treated well, and injured enemies 
were to receive care. Spies and snipers should not be executed on sight, but delivered 
alive to higher authorities for internment in prisoner camps.7
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There were petitions from several German Division commanders asking for it to be 
repealed, as it only seemed to encourage enemy resistance. However, shortly before the 
Iberians arrived at the front, Hitler ratified the Order.8 The war was certainly more static 
and less vicious in the area covered by the Army Group North: of the minimum estimate 
of 2,253 documented executions of commissars in the first year of war, only 17.32 per 
cent (405) were carried out by this Group. Between October and December 1941, the 
total number was 101, which came to 15.2 per cent. This figure rapidly declined in the 
first months of 1942.9 However, there is no empirical evidence so far that the Commissar 
Order was ever communicated to the Spanish officers. It is likely that orders were fol-
lowed and political commissars were summarily taken aside and shot. It is also possible 
that Spanish officers would spare their troops from such an act – as occurred in certain 
German units – by ordering the transfer of the commissars to BD high command, where 
they would be handed over to the Germans. However, some data suggests that the 
Spanish command and officers were aware of these instructions, particularly when the 
German Army Corps – which the BD answered to – sent orders to repeal them in specific 
operations. For instance, to encourage the surrender of the Soviet units surrounded in the 
Volkhov pocket (March–June 1942), Instruction 2018 from 12 May 1942 ordered the use 
of propaganda promising good treatment to whoever surrendered arms. ‘The troops shall 
promptly be made aware of the fact that it is forbidden to shoot political commissars, or 
those who voluntarily join our ranks. These commissars shall be subjected to the same 
treatment as the rest of the prisoners.’10 Clearly, it would be senseless to forbid the execu-
tion of commissars unless this was the usual practice. Similarly, in May 1943 the Spanish 
General Staff received notification from Army Corps L, stating that political commissar 
prisoners were ordered to ‘voluntarily offer themselves for employment in German 
legions’, as ‘it was evident to the Russian Command that we recently stopped shooting 
Russian commissars when they are captured’.11
Spanish Forces in Occupied Territory: An Idyllic 
Relationship?
To what extent can we empirically corroborate the benign image of the Spanish occupa-
tion policies on the Eastern Front? To begin, the German perception of this Iberian 
peculiarity was rather minimal. The close relations between Spanish troops and Russian 
civilians were not scandalizing enough to merit mention in any Wehrmacht report, nor 
did the Germans always behave so differently from the Spaniards.12 However, the 
Núñez Seixas 365
 13 See the anonymous diary of a Berlinese woman describing the arrival of Soviet troops and the 
complex relations with the occupying forces: Eine Frau in Berlin. Tagebuchaufzeichnungen 
vom 20. April bis 22. Juni 1945 (Frankfurt a.M., 2003). Some observations concerning 
Soviet women during the occupation in I. Rebrova, ‘Überlebensstrategien von Frauen 
in den besetzten Gebieten und in Partisaneneinheiten. Kriegsalltag und genderspezifis-
che Erinnerung’, in Babette Quinkert and Jörg Morré (eds), Deutsche Besatzung in der 
Sowjetunion 1941–1944. Vernichtungskrieg, Reaktionen, Erinnerung, (Paderborn, 2014), 
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relationship between a civilian population and an occupying army is always complex, 
even when the locals do not sympathize with the regime the invading force seeks to top-
ple. The need to survive in an environment of scarcity and uncertainty motivated many 
civilians to find common ground and avoid open confrontation with the invaders. This 
created a dichotomy that distinguished the impersonal occupying force from the indi-
vidual occupiers, with whom amicable relations were often formed. Eventually, social 
conventions began to crumble; flirting or sympathizing with the occupiers carried the 
inherent risk of developing a sense of closeness.13
Moreover, a delicate balance existed between the Russian peasants and the German 
army in the Army Group North area. With a more static war and less partisan activity 
than in the Army Groups Centre and South, the peasants provided the invading soldiers 
with food and housing. Post-war memoirs and accounts suggest that Germans were less 
hated by the peasants on the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts than Russian collaboration-
ists, Latvians, and the Estonian auxiliary troops. Willingly or otherwise, the village may-
ors (stárosta, elders) and peasant families often cooperated with the occupiers, and 
reported the guerrilla groups who seized the peasant’s possessions without a second 
thought.14
Exotic and Undisciplined Occupiers
The Spanish soldiers were already implicated in a series of minor incidents involving the 
peasantry during their first march on foot from Eastern Poland to the Russian Front 
(August–September 1941). In response to first complaints from the German liaison offic-
ers, Spanish commander-in-chief General Agustín Muñoz-Grandes issued an edict 
reminding the soldiers that ‘any attack to people, property, or unauthorized requisitions 
could be considered an infraction of the rights of the people against devastation or loot-
ing’ and punishable under Article 233 of the Spanish Military Code.15 However, the 
behaviour of the BD did not alter upon entering Russian territory; in late September, a 
German unit informed their superiors that a passing ‘division of Spanish soldiers’ had 
requisitioned livestock and chickens from local peasants in the village of Isifowo.16 
Spanish troops arrived at the rearguard station in Nowo-Sokolniki – the halfway point in 
their transfer to Volkhov – between 29 September and 13 October. The local German 
military police was ineffective in keeping the Spanish soldiers from engaging in looting 
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 23 See reports by liaison officer Dr Gutzschebauch, 2–10 October 1941, as well as reports 
to the IA department of the Army Group North, 2 November 1941, OKH to Army Group 
North, 3 November 1941, and of General von Chappuis to the Supreme Command of the 
16th Army, Grigorowo, 17 November 1941 (BA-MA, RH 19 III/774).
and intimidation. They destroyed the station searching for firewood, raided the town, 
looted warehouses, and requisitioned livestock and grains from peasant households. The 
Spanish officers apologised for the soldiers’ behaviour, saying that their actions corre-
sponded to their hatred for communism.17
The arrival of the Spaniards to the Volkhov Front certainly began chaotically; they 
lodged with the local residents in nearby villages, disrupting the routines the peasant 
families had become more or less accustomed to under German rule. The BD General 
Staff ordered that behaviour towards the locals be ‘prudent and proper’, avoiding ‘injus-
tice, coercion and violence, … as well as familiarity, which could be subject to espio-
nage’.18 However, Germans soon began receiving complaints from peasants regarding 
the Iberians’ plundering of food, livestock, and warm clothing.19 They also looted ‘exotic 
souvenirs’, especially Orthodox icons. It is difficult to discern how much of what the 
soldiers took corresponded to larceny, church requisitions, and other forms of acquisition 
or bartering, all of which formed a part of the Division’s daily life.20 In November 1942, 
a Spanish volunteer described his personal booty: ‘I found a little Russian suitcase, in 
which I plan to take four books and icons if possible, and I do believe it to be so. It’s not 
much, and certainly not “pretty” – there was quite the icon hunt around these houses for 
the first few days – but enough to be a souvenir.’21
The Germans attributed such behaviour to relaxed discipline, mismanagement by ill-
trained Spanish non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who had entered the ranks of the 
Army during the Spanish Civil War, the indifference of the BD High Command, and, 
especially, the hierarchical stance of the Division’s quartermaster, who distributed much 
to the officers and little to the soldiers.22 This lack of efficiency in the provisioning sys-
tem had been a feature of the Spanish army since the colonial wars of 1895–8 and 1907–
25, and was apparent during the foot march to Russia. By November 1941, the Army 
Group North was seriously considering replacing the BD quartermaster with an annexed 
department under German command.23 This may have led the discontented Spanish 
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in the unpublished memoirs of soldier Benigno Cabo (1944), Diario de guerra de Benigno 
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soldiers to provision themselves from the civilian population, as their German comrades 
had been doing for weeks and months. Violence was not always necessary. Upon arriving 
at the front, Sergeant Ramón Abadía described how easy it was to obtain food from the 
villagers, whom he regarded – like many of his comrades in arms – as good savages: 
‘with a little chocolate and some sweets we can trick them into giving us milk and pota-
toes … probably using the same methods as Columbus did when he discovered the 
Americas and the Indians’.24
There was not much to requisition. The local food situation in the rearguard of the 
Volkhov Front was critical since October 1941. Subjected to Wehrmacht demands, the 
peasants had already sold their livestock and almost everything of value they owned, 
including coats and boots. It was a poor county to begin with, with very little mechanized 
agriculture, and only half of the fertile lands could be farmed in that area. In October 
1941, many women, children, and elderly began to withdraw to the rearguard from areas 
close to the front. On 24 October, the Army Group North command drily noted that ‘it 
seems that sooner or later these people will all die of starvation’.25
The unruly conduct of the BD towards the peasants had already alarmed the German 
liaison staff by late October 1941. They had caught wind of the pervasive lack of disci-
pline in the relations between the Spanish volunteers and the civilian population, as well 
as the indiscriminate and sometimes coercive plundering of food and livestock. The 
Russian peasants themselves even complained to the Spanish command.26 The situation 
peaked with the Spanish soldiers’ ‘lack of control with women’, which generated ‘dis-
tasteful scenes’ and the threat of propagating venereal diseases.27 Adding to the continual 
requisitions, the ‘rapes and other nuisances to the civilian population’ made the exasper-
ated locals less cooperative in the anti-partisan fight.28 The BD General Staff recorded 
few cases against soldiers for ‘dishonest abuse’.29 However, in December 1941 com-
plaints even reached General Franco and the Spanish Minister of War. Confidential 
reports described the ‘unsavoury characters in the Division, who rob, murder and burn 
whatever they wish’, as well as the fact that officers ‘had to watch the troops, to avoid 
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Hartmann, Johannes Hürter, and Ulrike Jureit (eds), Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Bilanz 
einer Debatte (Munich, 2005), pp. 98–106.
them requisitioning everything they found in the neighbouring villages; as these were 
frequent, embarrassing cases’.30 The lack of appropriate equipment for surviving the 
winter aggravated the situation. When necessary, the Spaniards – and others – took felt 
boots, hats, and coats from the peasants, leaving them defenceless against the winter 
cold.31 The delay of the Christmas bonus dispatched from Spain, and its scarcity com-
pared to what was promised, generated additional discontent among the troops in late 
December 1941.32
Aside from their prejudice against the Spanish – which had surfaced among the offic-
ers of the Condor Legion during the Spanish Civil War33 – the German command con-
cluded that the structural cause of BD conduct stemmed from the hierarchic culture of 
the Spanish military. The chief commander of the Army Corps XXXVIII attributed the 
‘brutal conduct of the Spanish soldiers’ to the lack of discipline in the BD, pointing out 
how ‘the best food is unabashedly eaten by the officers as extra rations’. In December 
1941, the commander of the 16th Army demanded from Berlin that the divisionarios be 
relieved of their duties, to keep their lack of discipline from spreading to the German 
soldiers.34 Not only were the troublesome soldiers jeopardizing the Wehrmacht’s honour, 
their anarchic actions could lead the civilian population to overcome their fear of reprisal 
and support the partisans. Of course, German soldiers also occasionally created distur-
bances, but these were subject to Wehrmacht discipline. Systematic exploitation and 
more or less rational plundering was entirely different from uncontrolled requisitions 
that did not benefit the occupying army collectively.35
The BD enjoyed the privilege of not being subject to Wehrmacht military justice. This 
troubled the Germans, as they could not always impose their discipline on their allies. In 
November 1941, when two Spanish soldiers killed the town elders of Grigorowo and 
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Novgorod, the culprits were only sanctioned by BD command after significant pressure 
from the Germans.36 In December 1941, the Army Corps XXXVIII began to fear that 
incessant BD pillaging would make the peasants unwilling to collaborate in reporting 
sightings of Soviet incursions.37 Three months later, the Army Corps Martial Court 
explicitly indicated that the Blue Division was responsible for all major discipline issues 
within their jurisdiction and that no significant measures had been taken to address the 
problem. At that point, the Germans decided to arrest Spaniards caught pillaging or steal-
ing, and to incarcerate them for several days before handing them over to the Spanish 
military justice. The conduct of the divisionarios even led to relaxed discipline in the 
German 126th Infantry Division.38 However, other German divisions that had little or no 
contact with their Spanish comrades were also involved in aggression and mistreatment 
of the civilian population.39 Spaniards were not necessarily an exception.
The relief battalions arriving from Spain from March 1942 onwards, in which the 
proportion of wholehearted Fascists was even less, were no better behaved than their 
predecessors. Food theft was common during train stops in Polish, Baltic, or Russian 
territory. In December 1942, General Emilio Esteban-Infantes took command of the BD, 
which had been reassigned to the southern front of the Leningrad blockade. The troops 
began to receive better provisions of food and winter clothing, thanks to an increase in 
supplies from Spain.40 A better quartermaster and German insistence also helped to 
improve daily relations between the divisionarios and the civilian population.
Coexisting with the Enemy
Generally speaking, the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts were panoramas of hunger and 
desolation. Some records show that the Spaniards were aware of the terrible living condi-
tions in the besieged city, thanks to the stories of Soviet prisoners.41 Misery was the sta-
tus quo in the rearguard of the occupied area as well. In the village of Vyritsa, for example, 
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the civilian mortality rate increased eleven-fold in April 1942. Captain Serafín Pardo 
described months later how children and women would fight over the scraps the division-
arios gave them.42 When military surgeon Manuel de Cárdenas passed through the town 
of Gatchina, he wrote in his war diary of the malnourishment with clinical precision:
There are lots of people on the streets …; old, bearded mujiks, dirty and ragged; shabby old 
women with faces yellowed from many months of hunger. Pretty young women nonetheless 
poor and dirty; not as thin as the old women as they can work some and are better suited to 
finding food thanks to their youth. Barefoot urchins with hats on their heads but so horribly thin 
their legs look like they belong to skeletons … The hunger among these civilians is honestly 
frightening. They may not even survive the next winter. I often see men with juvenile features 
but who look so horribly aged, paled by avitaminosis and their legs swollen from hunger. And 
these half-men are the lucky ones, they are not in the prisoner camp.43
The civilians were so underfed that malnutrition weakened their immune systems and 
aggravated their illnesses. They lacked adequate medical attention. Spanish doctors in 
the immediate rearguard often helped the civilian population,44 but their good intentions 
were not always enough. In June 1942, Cárdenas visited a hospital for civilians and 
Soviet prisoners in Kolmovo,45 and what he saw horrified him: ‘The civilian population 
… survived this winter and now suffer from the most awful hunger and misery.’ The 
hospital environment was frighteningly gruesome: ‘It smells so incredibly bad … Each 
body is more emaciated than the last; their faces, hands and feet look like anatomical 
illustrations, where even the smallest tendon can be seen.’46
Despite occasional plundering, since the beginning of 1942 the Spanish soldiers were 
generally amicable to the civilian population. Orders from BD headquarters required the 
correct treatment of prisoners and civilians, but also warned of the dangers of excessive 
fraternization. In May 1943, Esteban-Infantes instructed the Division command to be 
wary of soldiers or officers living with women or Russian families outside Division pro-
tocol, but their responses showed little concern for this issue.47
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Yet, for many Russian women, children, and elderly, having an officer in the house 
with his assistants, or a squadron of soldiers, could be a lifeline for survival, giving them 
access to extra rations and clothing as well as protection against possible abuse from 
other soldiers. Generally, two months after their arrival at the front, the Spaniards were 
more welcome than the Germans, as they tended not to force the elderly to clear roads 
and let the peasants use their livestock for ploughing when the ground thawed. The 
Iberians often found in Russian peasant women ‘the family we lacked because it was far 
away’, while Spanish lodgers were seen as protection against the greater rigours of 
German occupation.48 However, Spaniards also became aware of the misery their ‘adop-
tive’ families suffered. Salvador Zanón noted in December 1941 that the hungry family 
of the isba (farmhouse) where his platoon lived also had to feed them:
Craba lives with her small, dirty, crying son, two very ugly women and two other lads of eight 
or ten years, who teach us Russian and eat the candy and chocolate we supply. These poor 
people live a sad, harsh life, but where else can they go? Here at least they have a few potatoes, 
well hidden so that we do not take them.49
Spanish officers were particularly welcome, as they brought with them better supplies. 
Vasíly P., a 13-year-old boy at the time, was lucky enough to have a Spanish lieutenant 
living with him and his mother. The officer put a guard at the door and received addi-
tional food supplies. He shared the food with the Russian family, as did many division-
arios.50 Other testimonies support this image. Ochapkina A. Dimitrieva remembered the 
Spanish soldiers’ good behaviour towards the peasant families taking refuge in the 
Otenskij monastery: ‘they were more human than the Germans’.51 According to the 
young collaborator Lidia Ósipova, in Pavlovsk the locals’ first impression of the exotic 
occupiers was ambivalent: ‘These Spaniards destroyed the image we had of their people 
as proud, noble, beautiful, etc. … They are small and unruly like monkeys; dirty swin-
dlers like gypsies’; but also ‘very kind’. Certainly, the success of the Iberian volunteers 
was not entirely due to their southern charm; from mid-1942, they often received pack-
ages from Spain, which contained products impossible to find in Russia, from chickpeas 
to liquor. They often distributed their surplus among the local people. Naturally, this 
endeared them to the civilians, who took to them, ‘as they had never been fond of the 
Germans’. On 17 September 1942, Lidia recorded that a Spanish captain had risked his 
life to save a homeless child during a bombardment. A few days later, BD soldiers wept 
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inconsolably at the funeral of a Russian girl hit by a bullet. On the downside, the 
organizational chaos that reigned in the Iberian rearguard created uncertainty among the 
civilians as to what was and was not allowed. Unlike the Germans, the Spaniards tended 
to be unpredictable.52
However, the requisitions did not end when the BD was transferred to Leningrad’s south-
ern flank. The peasants occasionally reported these events to Spanish officers, and in several 
cases forceful occupation and ransacking of homes by soldiers led to a council of war.53 A 
German lieutenant wrote in September 1942, ‘Whether they are German or Spanish, the 
soldiers who risk their lives in the vanguard do not ask themselves if the Muschik goes hun-
gry in winter, they simply take the potatoes from the ground.’ The Iberians were particularly 
unsystematic in pillaging. This caused trouble for the German command as the peasants, 
protesting the Spanish plundering, also pillaged everything they could find. The German 
officer wondered if they ‘should hang a couple [of peasants] as an example’.54
The adverse effects of thefts and requisitions on the image of the divisionarios among 
the Russian peasants were not always compensated for by equivalent acts of kindness 
by other soldiers and officers. As with other Wehrmacht divisions, experiences varied 
greatly among units and villages. When Captain De Andrés’s detachment passed through 
Viriza, they found a group of famished elderly persons and children whose chickens 
had been stolen by another Spanish unit. To repair this deed, De Andrés sacrificed a 
horse and distributed it among them. When Captain Serafín Pardo arrived at his new post 
on the Leningrad Front, he took in a starving Russian family to work as auxiliaries for 
the soldiers in exchange for ample rations. The son of that family returned to Spain with 
the divisionarios and became an engineer.55
Ugly Panienkas and Idealized Katiuskas
From the very beginning of the Spanish occupation, plenty of romances occurred between 
divisionarios and panienkas, the Polish word for girls that the Iberian volunteers also 
extended to Russian women. Numerous orders were issued from the BD General Staff 
prohibiting close relationships between Russian civilians and soldiers, which extended to 
dancing, walking arm in arm with ‘Soviet women’, knocking at their doors, and accept-
ing their invitations.56 The frequent reiteration of these instructions speaks of their 
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ineffectiveness, as does the lack of interest in enforcing them on the part of officers.57 
Many a Spanish volunteer maintained virtually platonic relations with young women 
they could barely communicate with through gestures. Soldier Roberto Rivera described 
in August 1942 how ‘My dear little friend Tatiana (19 years old) tries to teach me to 
speak Russian … Until now I have only learned to say jorasó = pretty and lin-blin = I 
love you.’58 Spanish soldiers portrayed themselves in the Hoja de Campaña (BD trench 
journal) as surrounded by doting women who washed their clothes ‘because I give them 
sweets in exchange’.
Though gallantry with Russian women was more intense on the Leningrad Front than 
the Volkhov Front,59 matches between the occupying soldiers and Russian women were 
plausible in the shared living conditions that prevailed on both areas. It was not limited 
to the Spanish either; even the supposedly cold Germans fancied Russian women. The 
sexual relations between the occupiers and Slavic women were far more commonplace 
than either side cared to acknowledge.60 However, Spanish soldiers’ romances with 
Russian women sometimes ended up in unauthorized weddings, and by mid-1942 the 
situation was scandalizing a Wehrmacht High Command that was only willing to recog-
nize marriages with Baltic women. The BD command decided not to officially validate 
any matrimoniies between divisionarios and Russian women, forbidding that they be 
taken to Spain when the soldiers returned.61 However, some of these marriages served to 
hide a different type of relationship. For example, Colonel Robles Pazos ordered his 
Russian lover to marry one of the Division’s Russian interpreters so he could bring her 
back to Spain.62
Though some marriages occurred, very few sincere relationships emerged out of these 
circumstances. For a start, the Russian women encountered were quite removed from the 
feminine ideal held by the Iberians, especially those from urban, middle-class backgrounds. 
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Even when they could find Russian women with urban habits, such as in Minsk, their feel-
ings were fairly similar. Private Ramírez Morales described it as ‘looking through an old 
photo album from the 1920s’.63 Letters and diaries portrayed Russian country girls as 
females lacking graces, dirty and unkempt, aged by work, hunger and misery, dressed in 
rags and not always given to respecting traditional morals. A far cry from the feminine ideal 
cherished by Spanish men, especially those from the urban middle class.64 Private Martínez 
Tessier noted the want of delicacy of form, distinction of dress, and silk stockings in the 
first Russian peasant girls he saw: ‘The women have no femininity. … Their manners are 
also manly.’65 Another volunteer of middle-class background wrote that ‘the woman, in 
Russia … lacks the most exquisite sense: femininity. She is a bear that works the fields.’66
The distance between Russian peasant women and the aesthetic ideals for Spanish 
women – or European urban middle-class women in general – was not only a conse-
quence of war privation and German occupation.67 It was understood as one more exam-
ple of Soviet barbarism, a male monster that had supposedly stripped women of all 
feminine and moral content in order to facilitate the destruction of traditional family ties. 
Their lack of hygiene also fit with the dirtiness of the Russian context. Lieutenant 
Arenales noted how only female teachers were worthy of interest, ‘since they seem to 
wash, which is uncommon’. The pseudo-oriental physical features he thought he saw in 
them were also considered less attractive: ‘small, slanted eyes that seem sunken due to 
exaggerated cheekbones’.68
Not everything qualified as the naïve love or idealized respect for peasants that was 
later published in the memoirs of Spanish veterans.69 Often, the objective was mere 
sexual entertainment with peasant women, who were seen as primitives who might lack 
morals and welcome promiscuity. In October 1941, several Spanish soldiers entered a 
house in Podberesje, looking for a sergeant and a corporal who were missing from their 
unit. There they witnessed how their comrades made love to (or raped?) some Russian 
women with oriental features in a dirty, promiscuous environment, according to the war 
diary of one of them:
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There were two rooms … and they smelled disgusting, in one were the ‘fathers’ and the 
‘children’ of the femmes fatales, not at all concerned with the shrieks or with what their 
daughters or sisters were doing … and in the other, unbelievably, none other than the sergeant 
and the corporal, talking little and doing much, with two Spaniards and two Germans sitting 
there drinking and singing and ‘admiring’ the Russian beauties. You should have seen them! 
And especially – what a fright – two of them were short, stout, with slanted eyes, mongoloid 
lips and repugnant arms … one was missing half a nose and half of her face was burned, and 
the other kept farting so much that it turned my stomach …70
The ironic farewell letter of a contributor to the Hoja de Campaña in March of 1944 
demonstrated a tone quite removed from Don Juan gallantry. He suggested that his 
panienka should continue to cultivate the barley and alfalfa; he begged her too to remain 
true to ‘himself, Perez, Sergeant Gomez and Corporal Ortiz’.71 Blatant prostitution also 
occurred. One teacher from Samokrasa, finding she could no longer impart lessons, 
earned a living for herself and the children by ‘selling herself as a prostitute to the 
Spaniards who occupied the school complex’.72 Some diaries suggest that other panien-
kas offered their charms in exchange for food, and relationships could also blossom from 
such encounters. Near Sitno in early December, one logistics soldier visited ‘some 
panienkas that I was told were quite nice looking. They laughed and “we had fun”.’ He 
visited one of them several more days. When his unit was forced to withdraw, she asked 
in vain that he take her with him.73
Corporal Antonio Herrero wrote in April 1943 that after attending the Catholic mass, 
the soldiers in his company attended a ‘magnificent banquet followed by a fun dance 
with the local girls’. Evening parties were common in spring and summer, often in front 
of an Orthodox church that had been reopened by the occupying forces.74 However, 
some testimonies suggest that many of these fetes were organized by the German 
Kommandaturen, which recruited local women with food. One Russian interpreter indi-
cated in letters to Spain that his main duties involved travelling in the rearguard seeking 
girls for the officers’ parties.75 Relations with Russian women implied a mix of seduction 
and distrust, gallantry and fear: they might be collaborating as decoys for a partisan 
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ambush at the party.76 Additionally, the daily disputes between German and Spanish 
soldiers often revolved around food, the black market, or women. Many German soldiers 
and Germanic Waffen SS volunteers, disregarded the racial dictum prohibiting sexual 
relations with female Soviet civilians. Antonina Davychenko (born 1932) wrote of a 
fistfight that occurred when Spanish soldiers protected a Russian woman from the har-
assments of German soldiers. Lidia Osípova indicated that when the Iberians arrived in 
Pavlovsk, ‘all the loose women who were with the Germans immediately went to be with 
the Spaniards’, attracted by their gregarious Latin nature and their better food rations. 
Russian women also regarded them as better lovers.77
Children constituted a very different chapter in the narrative, as creatures whose inno-
cence could easily symbolize and reinforce the re-Christianizing mission Spaniards 
attributed to themselves.78 Many volunteers saw themselves as protectors of children, 
and gave them treats and food. Many were taught to pray or speak a few words in 
Spanish.79 Compassion for the children in their misery showed up in testimonies. Martín 
Velasco wrote of the hunger in Vitebsk:
Four Russian children near me are holding in their little hands a greasy paper with lamb bones 
from our mess, which the cooks gave them. It is pitiful and sad to see how these children peel 
bones with almost no meat on them and look at me with small sad eyes, saying gout [sic], which 
in German means ‘good’.80
Many Spanish veterans described having nourished and protected little children – virtu-
ally adopting them – as their best memory of Russia. The later accounts of elderly peas-
ants from the Novgorod area corroborate this. Unlike the Germans, Spanish soldiers 
were often surrounded by children.81 Many of these malenkis were war orphans who 
sometimes formed bands that wandered about the rearguard searching for food or shelter, 
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begging or engaging in petty theft.82 A Falangist veteran described his best memory from 
the Russian Front: ‘Lyda Kakuska Sylgueida, 12 years old, blonde as a peach. Her face 
was rosy, she was a thin, angelical little creature. … She ate with us, displaying extreme 
tenderness and delicacy … Sad smile. She never spoke of her parents.’ BD troops fre-
quently supported orphans or the children of widows; occasionally, sexual favours from 
the mothers were implicitly acknowledged as the price for such altruistic protection.83 In 
spite of the Franco regime’s zeal to avoid infiltration by Soviet spies, several docu-
mented cases tell of Russian children and adolescents hiding in wagons or dressing as 
divisionarios and being taken to Spain by Spanish soldiers and officers, who then incor-
porated them into their families.84 This also constituted a clear difference from the atti-
tudes of German soldiers.
Dealing with Partisans: Benevolence or Inefficacy?
Anti-guerrilla operations and the treatment of captured Soviet partisans are among the 
thorniest issues in the post-1945 narratives of Spanish veterans. Problematic from the 
moment the Blue Division entered Soviet territory in September 1941, partisans were 
responsible for a significant number of Spanish casualties. However, war veterans’ mem-
oirs generally recalled that burnt Russian villages and hanged peasants were always the 
work of the German allies.85 To avoid poisoning by the enemy, the BD command 
instructed in October 1941 that it was best to have peasants or Russian prisoners drink up 
to 1.5 litres of water before it was declared potable. During the march through occupied 
territories, members of the first expedition witnessed German reprisals against partisans 
or suspects. In their diaries, several Iberian soldiers wrote of seeing partisans – and civil-
ians accused of collaborating with them – being shot.86 They also saw partisans hung in 
town squares as a warning to the civilian population. Some equated partisans with Jews, 
based on a characteristic slogan of Wehrmacht propaganda.87
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These scenes multiplied proportionally when Spanish volunteers reached the Volkhov 
Front in October 1941 and during the subsequent offensive. Víctor J. Jiménez described 
in 1943 how his literary alter-ego, an artillery officer, was ordered by the Germans to 
execute two partisan commanders the very day he arrived at the front line.88 The 
Information Section of the Blue Division interrogated dozens of prisoners to identify 
political commissars and possible partisans. They were then sent to the German Army 
Corps Headquarters and most likely shot.89
The divisionarios perceived partisan danger as a diffuse, omnipresent threat: like 
‘ghosts’ who populated the dense forests, which ‘were infested with Russians. Bands of 
them fight with the support of the civilian population. We hear news of betrayals, 
ambushes, and then reprisals. It is common to see someone from the towns on the banks 
of the Volkhov hanging from a beam or telephone post.’90 By early 1942 nearly 20,000 
Soviet partisans operated in the rearguard of the Army Group North and were particu-
larly abundant in the Novgorod region. However, the level of partisan activity was mod-
erate, at least compared to White Russia or Ukraine.91 The command of the Army Group 
North rearguard took less aggressive measures to combat partisans and used propaganda 
to encourage peasant cooperation or the surrender of guerrilla members. Reprisals and 
firing squads intensified after mid-1942,92 and the bulk of partisan activity occurred 
in the far rearguard, the rückwartiges Heeresgebiet, where no Spanish soldiers were 
deployed. Other foreign units, such as the Hungarians in the rear of the Army Group 
Centre, were systematically deployed to combat partisans. These units frequently 
employed a high level of violence, stimulated by fear and the brutalization of their fight-
ing environment. Spaniards, in contrast, were never called upon by the German Command 
to carry out this kind of task.93
In October 1941, instructions from the BD High Command broadly recommended 
that if ‘any individuals of the opposing army, in isolation or in groups’, were caught ‘car-
rying out acts of sabotage such as blowing up bridges, assaulting vehicles or lodgings, or 
carrying out guerrilla warfare dressed as civilians’, the officers in charge were authorized 
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to do ‘whatever needs to be done with these individuals, depending on the tactical situa-
tion’. Eleven days later, a new instruction indicated that in light of the increasing intensity 
of guerrilla activity, sector chiefs and officers who caught partisans should assume guilt 
and not seek conclusive evidence, which might have been destroyed ‘with the possible 
complicity of the locals’. Officers must not be ‘lenient with the resulting threat to the 
security of the area entrusted to us’. Suspicious individuals should be handed over to the 
closest German command and ‘snipers’ should be hanged in a public place after interroga-
tion and remain visible for several days as a warning.94 These guidelines were softened in 
mid-1942, instructing that partisans who surrendered be given the same treatment as Red 
Army deserters. In theory, Spaniards were to hand over all punishable cases and summary 
procedures against prisoners of war were to be carried out by the closest German military 
authorities. The few testimonies that mention retaliatory operations indicate that locals 
were always handed over to the Germans, who also carried out massive reprisals in towns 
where sentries had been murdered. There is evidence that Iberian soldiers handed over 
escaped prisoners to the competent authorities in the 16th and 18th Armies.95
In early 1942, the German command decided to relieve the Blue Division of all sentry 
duties in the near rearguard, partly because the Spaniards had to cover a very broad 
section of the front.96 Where they were responsible for these duties, evidence suggests 
that control of the civil population was less brutal and thorough than with the 
Germans and the ‘security divisions’ and ‘protection teams’ (Sicherungsdivisionen and 
Schutzmannschaften) that operated in the rear. The Iberians maintained practices remi-
niscent of those used in the former colonial wars, rather than the brutalized and radical 
‘totalitarian counter-insurgence’ methods of the Wehrmacht.97 Spanish efficacy in the 
anti-partisan fight was also dubious: their evacuations of the civil population from towns 
were often chaotic, without ‘any military supervision whatsoever’ and without the 
authorization of the Division High Command. This might facilitate Soviet espionage and 
favour the partisans. In July 1943, cases of Spanish soldiers losing their documentation 
and weapons to Russian civilians prompted the command of Army Corps L to recom-
mend that the Spaniards exercise stricter control over the population.98
In May 1943, increased partisan activity led the XXXVIII Army Corps command to 
involve the divisions on the front in the persecution of partisans operating in their 
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respective rearguards. Thus, the Spaniards were required to work with detachments of 
auxiliary Russian and Baltic troops. Some testimonies corroborate that the BD command 
had given orders to their units to execute any captured partisans on site. In October, 
instructions from Army Corps L indicated reprisals against local civilians were to be car-
ried out wherever Wehrmacht soldiers had been attacked. However, Spanish efficacy in 
controlling partisans and civilians acting as informants did not improve. On 18 July 
1943, the Blue Division headquarters in Pokrovskaia suffered a precise Soviet artillery 
attack due to information provided by spies infiltrated among Russian assistants to the 
BD.99 Four months later, the German command learned of the presence of a group of 
partisans to the south of Nikolawja and requested the assistance of 200 Spanish soldiers 
in ‘cleansing’ the area. However, the operation failed for lack of efficiency among the 
Spaniards. German officers blamed the botched operation on their allies’ repeated indis-
cretions with their Russian aides, who then passed on the information to partisans.100
Few BD internal reports mention explicit anti-partisan actions or their results, but the 
exceptions show that they did occur.101 Spanish testimonies tend not to clarify who shot 
the partisans and provide few details regarding reprisals. Several BD deserters interro-
gated by the Red Army by the end of 1942 admitted hearing stories of reprisals against 
partisans from their German comrades, but said they had never actually seen any.102 
Other testimonies allude to German soldiers and medics ‘finishing off’ injured partisans 
or regular soldiers, as well as prisoners. However, the Germans did not act alone: some 
divisionarios stated that they were ordered to execute those who had been arrested and 
summarily tried.103 Captain De Andrés recalled with disgust his interrogations of several 
civilians over the suspected disappearance of one of his men: ‘for the first time, I acted 
as a German oppressor’. Yet, several testimonies alleged that the partisans ‘respected’ the 
Spaniards more than they did the Germans.104
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The perspective of the Russian civilians suggests something similar. Spanish soldiers 
occasionally carried out reprisals against civilians when blinded by a desire to avenge the 
death of a comrade. Lidia Nikolaévna was 11 when her village of Rogavka, located in the 
rearguard, became the residence of several detachments of Spanish soldiers resting from 
combat in early December 1941. Partisan activity immediately increased, involving sev-
eral Spanish victims.105 The Russian girl witnessed how the Spaniards rounded up all the 
inhabitants from the town and surrounding area to take revenge and hang a partisan 
fighter. In this case, the local German commander impeded greater reprisals, as the 
Wehrmacht needed the civilians for labour. The BD rearguard was no blissful Arcadia.106
Brutalization, Indoctrination, or Exception?
Assessments of the Spanish conduct on the Eastern Front should fall somewhere between 
the ‘clean Blue Division’ legend – as reproduced in the post-1945 narrative based on war 
veteran memoirs and in the more or less apologetic historical literature – and the general 
characteristics that apply to most German Wehrmacht troops, particularly in the northern 
sector of the Eastern Front. The Spanish 250th Division never had a central role in the War 
of Extermination unleashed by the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, nor are there indica-
tions that the Spanish commanders knew of the long-term occupation schemes of the 
Third Reich leaders, which were implemented by the military. Unlike Hungarian soldiers 
in the Ukraine and Romanian military police and combatants in Bessarabia, Bukovina, 
and Transnistria, Spaniards did not participate systematically, or specifically, in the rear-
guard in collective reprisals against Russian, Polish, Byelorussian, or Baltic civilians, or 
Jews.107 Moreover, Spanish troops were not affected by strong ideological or sociocultural 
factors. Certainly, some racialist undertones underpinned the Spaniards’ perceptions of 
the Russian other, which they regarded as barbarian, Asiatic, and culturally inferior to 
‘civilized’ Western cultures. In their view, this presumed cultural inferiority had paved the 
way for the success of Bolshevism, which could only flourish on fertile soil. Spanish 
racial views were not totally deprived of biological elements; yet, they were mostly 
shaped by historic, cultural, and geographical determinism. Since the mid-nineteenth 
382 War in History 25(3)
108 For the emergence and development of racial thought in Spain, see J. Goode, Impurity 
of Blood: Defining Race in Spain, 1870–1930 (Baton Rouge, 2007). On Spanish soldiers’ 
racial and cultural prejudices towards Russia and the Russians on the Eastern front, see 
Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, ‘Russia and the Russians in the Eyes of the Spanish Soldiers of the 
Blue Division (1941–44)’, Journal of Contemporary History, 52.2 (2017), pp.352–74.
109 See Vejas G. Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, 
and German Occupation in World War I (Cambridge, 2000), as well as Wolfram Dornik, 
“‘Ganz in den Rahmen dieses Bildes passt auch die Bevölkerung”. Raumerfahrung und 
Raumwahrnehmung von österreichisch-ungarischen Soldaten an der Ostfront des Ersten 
Weltkrieges’, in Bernd Bachinger and Wolfram Dornik (eds), Jenseits des Schützengrabens. 
Der Erste Weltkrieg im Osten: Erfahrung–Wahrnehmung–Kontext (Innsbruck, Vienna and 
Bozen, 2013), pp. 27–43.
110 ‘La raza’, Hoja de Campaña, 88 (10 October 1943).
111 Rutherford, Combat and Genocide, pp. 115–52, 240–79.
112 Russian testimonies after 1944 only indicate that a Spanish lieutenant in Koritsko was 
responsible for some shootings of peasants suspected of collaborating with the partisans 
(Kovalev, Dobrovol’cí, p. 369).
century, Spanish anthropologists considered their nation to be the outcome of a ‘racial 
alloy’, which had continuity in the American colonies.108 In this respect, Spanish percep-
tions of the East had more in common with German and Austrian perceptions of the Slavic 
enemy during the First World War.109 The Blue Division’s trench journal recalled in 
October 1943 that race expressed ‘a homeland based first on blood’, but also on ‘mixed 
blood … From intense effusions of very diverse elements, Spain had forged its perennial 
racial basis.’ Although Lenin and the Jews had erased ‘whatever is noble in mankind’ from 
the Russian people, the invaders would re-educate them and return the Russians to 
Christian faith.110 Most Spanish volunteers had not been socialized in biological racism 
(in relation to Slavs and Jews). The fighting environment at the Volkhov Front, and later 
in Leningrad, did not foster an accumulative radicalization of Spanish attitudes towards 
the enemy or civilians. The northern sector of the Eastern Front was more static than the 
centre and south, with less partisan activity. Spanish soldiers had not been fighting for 
months before they arrived on the front and stayed less time on average than their German 
comrades. These factors decisively enhanced the brutalization of the various Wehrmacht 
units, as has been demonstrated for the 121st, 123rd, and 126th German Divisions of the 
Army Group North.111 Their absence also conditioned the lack of steady brutalization of 
the Spanish Division.
Less certainty exists regarding other aspects, such as the treatment of prisoners and 
methods applied in the anti-partisan fight.112 General benevolence towards Soviet prison-
ers from December 1941 onwards was evident among Spaniards, but there were also 
summary executions and interrogations of prisoners in combat. Iberians were not espe-
cially effective, zealous, or cruel in reprisals and in the fight against partisans. They 
sometimes did execute civilians accused of hiding partisans. However, no evidence has 
been found to indicate they engaged in collective killings or reprisals against entire vil-
lages. German reports hardly mentioned Spanish participation in these activities. They 
do, however, reveal a certain lack of trust in Spaniards to carry out rearguard population 
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control and cleansing actions, given the demonstrated inefficacy of the Iberians in this 
area. The Blue Division’s compliance with the Commissar Order also remains unclear. 
There is no mention of summary executions of Soviet commissars in Spanish memoirs 
and BD files. This does not necessarily mean it did not happen, since that order would 
have been transmitted verbally to Wehrmacht combatants.
The attitudes of Spaniards towards civilians were more ambivalent than later narra-
tives suggest. Veteran Alberto Díaz expressed years later how Spaniards got along ‘fairly 
well’ with Russian civilians but ‘whoever says the Russians were bad is lying and who-
ever says they were good is also lying and whoever says we Spaniards were saints lies 
too’; among the troops there were also ‘louts, rogues, opportunists, even criminals’.113 
The image of Russia and the Russians that Spanish officers and volunteers had, or forged 
at the front, did not include racial hatred and contempt based on biological-genetic ten-
ets. However, diaries, letters, published articles, and caricatures in the Falangist press 
from that time show a much more nuanced picture than the idyllic, harmonious coexist-
ence described in memoirs and writings published after 1945. The misery of the Russian 
peasants, their servile and submissive character, were understood as the consequence of 
communist degeneration, de-Christianization, and a supposed destruction of basic moral 
values such as respect for the family. Climate, culture, land, and centuries of non-Euro-
pean tradition were also perceived to be an influence. Russians were an Asian people: 
bloated, lacking spiritual personality, telluric, and primitive, with amoral tendencies that 
pre-disposed them to being the propitiatory victim of communism.114
This might be considered cultural racism, but it was not biological-genetic bigotry. It 
considered individuals to be determined by their cultural milieu, leaving little or no room 
for change.115 Often, this was subliminally expressed in tones redolent of social hygiene: 
frequent allusions to their dirtiness and lack of personal or family hygiene helped under-
mine consideration of Russians as human beings and transform political or social argu-
ments into biological ones. Such a mindset also festered in Spanish fascism, which 
considered the occupied peoples as spiritually and culturally inferior or ‘underage’, 
though not as a biologically subhuman Untermensch. This peculiar vision of the enemy 
might incite commiseration and paternalism but never prevented Russian civilians from 
suffering requisitions and theft. Hierarchically uneven and logistically deficient troop 
provisioning was a factor from the moment the Spanish volunteers left their training 
camps in Germany. This was aggravated by organizational deficiencies and a lack of 
discipline among the BD troops, who were a heterogeneous mix of career officers, non-
commissioned officers with little training, enthusiastic fascist volunteers, mercenary 
legionnaires, drafted soldiers who had been persuaded to go to Russia, adventurers, and, 
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finally, unemployed workers seeking a living. From the moment they began to march in 
the summer of 1941, there were constant incidents involving the civilian population – all 
of which defy precise quantification – including requisitions, theft, sexual abuse, and 
some cases of rape.
Spanish soldiers were not habitually involved in the homicide of Russian peasants; in 
fact, they coexisted reasonably well, given their condition as invading troops in a place 
such as the Eastern Front. A similar pattern of behaviour towards the civil population has 
also been signalled for other German divisions of the Army Group North.116 A few signifi-
cant examples have revealed just how non-idyllic these relations were. Many Spanish 
officers had learned in the colonial wars in Northern Morocco to let their troops find provi-
sions on location, a practice they continued unscrupulously in Russia.117 Colonel Díaz de 
Villages recalled the argument put forward by a Falangist volunteer engaged in a discus-
sion with a German military policeman: ‘It would be absurd … if after seeing so many of 
ours fall, after suffering such a difficult war, we could not even eat a Russian chicken.’118
The complexity inherent in the presence of an occupying army among civilians led 
many Spanish soldiers and officers who lodged in the isbas to function as protectors of 
Russian families, which were mainly composed of young or elderly women, children and 
old men. The divisionarios would feed and protect them in exchange for services that 
ranged from lodging and laundry to sexual favours. The low intensity and even absence 
of biological racism led to a greater degree of familiarity between most Spanish soldiers 
and Russians civilians. Contrary to Romanian and Hungarian troops in the Army Groups 
Centre and South,119 the Spaniards did not become involved in systematic reprisals or 
large-scale murders of civilians. They were, nonetheless, responsible for continual theft, 
requisitioning, and pillaging, along with occasional sexual abuse. This was typical of the 
experiences of other occupying Axis armies during the Second World War, such as the 
relatively benign presence of Germans in Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands. In 
these countries, the experience of occupation was characterized by a low level of every-
day tension, close interactions between occupiers and some segments of the occupied 
population, and sporadic outbursts of violence, reprisals, and other incidents.120 In the 
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context of the Eastern Front, this was also characteristic – to some extent – of the occupa-
tion policy of the Italian army on the Don Front.121 With regards to Spanish troops’ 
behaviour towards Russian civilians in the Volkhov and Leningrad area, what scandal-
ized the Army Group North, influenced by the German military’s own stereotypes, was 
not the lukewarm commitment to the Geneva Convention but the fact that Iberian 
soldiers were unsystematic in their pillaging. This negatively affected the immediate 
interests of the Wehrmacht in its attempts to not completely alienate the civilian 
population.
However, it must not be forgotten that the Blue Division effectively though indi-
rectly aided a strategic action that served the mid-range war of extermination plans 
behind the invasion of the USSR: the sentencing of three million people to death by 
starvation. Many Falangist volunteers, officers, and NCOs rejected Russia and the 
Russians as an Asian people, who they considered to be culturally and spiritually 
inferior. In addition to blaming Russia and communism for the misery of the peas-
ants, many also accused the submissive and brutish Russians themselves. This view 
was permeated with commiseration and even empathy, not racial hatred. Spanish 
soldiers might commit excesses; they felt a certain sense of cultural superiority 
towards the enemy and civilians, akin to that experienced by North American sol-
diers facing the Japanese in the Pacific.122 But the Blue Division – its commanders, 
many of its officers, and most of its soldiers – had not envisaged the extermination 
or subjugation of the Slavic population. Most were convinced that they had come to 
restore Christian faith and civilization in Russia by eradicating communism. In this 
they diverged radically from the majority of the soldiers of the Wehrmacht, although 
not too much from the views held by German Catholic soldiers, or Italian soldiers, 
on the Eastern Front.123
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